In 2000{2001, the current account de¯cit of Portugal reached 10% of GDP, up from 2{3% at the start of the 1990s. Forecasts are for these de¯cits to continue in the 8{9% range for the inde¯nite future. Greece is not far behind. Its current account de¯cit in 2000-2001 was equal to 6-7%, up from 1{2% in the early 1990s, and again, the forecasts are for de¯cits to remain high, in the 5{6% range. This is not the¯rst time that some of the small member countries of the European Union run large current account de¯cits. In the early 1980s, Portugal for example ran de¯cits above 10% of GDP. But these de¯cits had a very di®erent°avor: Portugal then was still reeling from its 1975 revolution, from the loss of its colonies, and from the second oil shock; the government was running a large budget de¯cit, in excess of 16% of GDP.
and the current account de¯cit eliminated. In contrast, Portugal today is not su®ering from large adverse shocks; the o±cial budget de¯cit has been reduced since the early 1990s (although with some signs of relapse in 2002, as current estimates imply that Portugal may exceed the limits imposed by the Stability Pact), and¯nancial markets show no sign of worry.
The fact that Portugal and Greece are members of both the European Union and of the Euro area, and, in each case, the poorest members, suggests a natural explanation for these current account de¯cits. They are exactly what theory suggests can and should happen when countries become more closely linked in goods and¯nancial markets. To the extent that they are the countries with higher rates of return, poor countries should see an increase in investment. And to the extent that they are the countries with higher growth prospects, they should also see a decrease in saving. Thus, on both counts, poor countries should run larger current account de¯cits. Symmetrically, richer countries should run larger current account surpluses.
The purpose of our paper is to see whether this hypothesis indeed¯ts the facts. We conclude that it does, with saving rather than investment as the main channel through which integration a®ects current account balances.
We proceed in four steps.
First, we use a workhorse open economy model to show how, for poorer countries, goods and¯nancial market integration are likely to lead both to a decrease in saving and an increase in investment, and so, to a larger current account de¯cit. We also discuss how other, less direct, implications of the process of integration, such as domestic¯nancial liberalization, are likely to reinforce the outcome.
Second, we look at the panel data evidence from the OECD since 1975.
We document that the recent evolution of Portugal and Greece is indeed part of a more general evolution: The dispersion of current account positions has steadily increased since the early 1990s. And current account positions have become increasingly related to the level of output per capita Current Account De¯cits of the country. This evolution is visible within the OECD as a whole, but is stronger within the European Union, and stronger yet within the Euro area.
The channel appears to be mostly through a decrease in saving|typically private saving|rather than through an increase in investment.
Third, we return to the cases of Portugal and Greece. We conclude that the recent history of the two countries is largely consistent with the¯nd-ings of the panel data regressions. Lower private saving|due to both internal and external¯nancial market liberalization but also to future growth prospects|and, to a lesser extent, higher investment, appear to be the main drivers of the larger current account de¯cits.
We end by taking up two issues raised by our¯ndings. First, we relate our results to the large body of research triggered by the Feldstein{Horioka puzzle|the¯nding of a high cross{country correlation between saving and investment. We show that, consistent with our¯ndings, this correlation has indeed substantially declined over time, especially within the Euro area. At least for this last group of countries, the Feldstein{Horioka puzzle appears to be largely gone. Second, we discuss whether the current attitude of benign neglect vis a vis the current account in Euro area countries is appropriate, or whether countries such as Portugal and Greece should worry and take measures to reduce their de¯cits. We conclude that, to a¯rst order, they should not.
Current Account Balances and Economic Integration
A country that wants to borrow from the rest of the world must take into account two elements: the cost of borrowing; and the price cuts it will need to make to generate su±cient export revenues to repay the debt in the future.
In this context, increased¯nancial integration, i.e. either lower and/or a°atter cost of borrowing, clearly makes it more attractive to borrow. Increased goods market integration, i.e. a more elastic demand for the coun-try's goods has a similar e®ect. Thus, in response to increased integration, borrower countries will want to borrow more. And, by a symmetric argument, lender countries will want to lend more. The distribution of current account balances will widen. 1 The purpose of the model below is to formalize this argument. 2 The model is straightforward; but it will be useful in organizing the empirical work and discussing some of the policy and welfare issues later on.
Think of a group of n countries trading goods and assets among themselves (for convenience, we shall sometimes refer to this group of countries as the \world" but what we have in mind is the trading group).
Each country produces its own good, but households in each country 1 A classic example of the e®ects of economic and monetary integration is that of Puerto Rico's integration with the rest of the United States in the early postwar period. An equally classic analysis of what happened then can be found in Ingram [1962] . Between the early 1950s and the second part of decade, as a result of increased¯nancial integration between the island and the rest of the United States, private capital in°ows into Puerto Rico from the rest of the U.S. jumped from 3 to 11% of Puerto Rico's GDP per year.
One half of these in°ows came in the form of direct investment, one half in the form of long-term borrowing by local banks; both of these sources of external¯nancing had been virtually non-existent up to the mid 50s. Investment increased from 16 to 20% of GDP. The current account de¯cit between Puerto Rico and the rest of the United States.
widened even more, reaching, by 1958, a stable level of 12 per cent of GDP per year, and re°ecting not only an increase in investment, but also a decrease in saving. In a later essay, Ingram [1973] used the experience of Puerto Rico to suggest that a European monetary union would free member states from the link between national saving and investment.
Our paper can be seen as checking Ingram's hypothesis. consume the same composite good.
Households live for two periods and maximize: log(C t ) + log(C t+1 ) where:
and their intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
P is the price of the good produced by the country, in terms of consumption. R is the interest rate in terms of the composite consumption good, the consumption interest rate for short.
The parameter ¾ is the elasticity of substitution among goods, and, to satisfy the Marshall{Lerner condition, is assumed to be greater than one.
The parameter x is a wedge between the world consumption interest rate and the rate at which a country can borrow (We are considering here a borrower country).
For the time being, we take production as exogenous. Thus, movements in the current account re°ect only saving decisions.
With logarithmic preferences, consumption spending in the current period is given by:
De¯ne ca as the ratio of the current account balance to national income.
Then, ca is given by:
The three terms in the last expression on the right give the determinants of the current account balance:
² Output growth. The¯rst term is equal to one plus the rate of growth of domestic output. The higher output is next period relative to this period, the larger the current account de¯cit.
² The interest rate. The second term gives the e®ect of the interest rate faced by the country. The higher the consumption interest rate, or the higher the wedge, the more expensive it is to borrow, the lower the current account de¯cit.
² The rate of change in the terms of trade. The third term is equal to one plus the rate of change of the price of the domestic good in terms of consumption. The larger the fall in the price of the domestic good required next period to sell domestic goods and repay the debt, the more expensive it is to borrow, the lower the current account de¯cit.
The expression above, though extremely simple, is su±cient to illustrate the e®ect of integration on the current account balance of a country that, like Portugal and Greece, is poorer than its trading partners, but catching up.
Assume that all other countries are fully integrated, thus facing the same interest rate R (with no wedge). Sum the¯rst-order conditions for the consumer's problem (1=C t = R(1=C t+1 )) over all countries, use the fact that aggregate consumption is equal to aggregate income, to get:
where Y ¤ is the average world level of output, and g ¤ is the world rate of output growth.
Noting that the demand of the good produced a given country is given Current Account De¯cits 7 by:
and correspondingly for P t+1 , we can express the current account :as
So, if output growth in the country we are considering exceeds the output growth of its trading partners, and the borrowing wedge x is not too large, the country will run a current account de¯cit.
For countries such as Greece and Portugal, economic integration has had main three dimensions: the Single European Market; the integration of¯nancial markets within the European Union; monetary union, and the adoption of a common currency. All three channels clearly work in the direction of widening the current account de¯cits of these countries:
² We can think of the single European market as leading to increases in the elasticity of demand facing domestic goods, as increases in ¾.
Beyond the elimination of tari®s, factors such as the harmonization of safety requirements for products, the extension of distribution networks, clearly lead to goods being closer substitutes, and thus to higher elasticity of demand for each good. 3 If so, goods market integration reduces the adverse terms of trade e®ect a country faces when it needs to generate a current account surplus to repay the debt: this makes borrowing more attractive.
Going back to the expression above for the current account, assume that the country we are looking at has a higher growth rate than its trading partners, so it is running a current account de¯cit. Then, the higher ¾ the larger the size of the de¯cit.
² We can think of¯nancial integration as leading to a decrease in x.
Beyond the elimination of capital controls and other explicit barriers to¯nancial°ows, factors such as the harmonization of rules such as reporting requirements are likely to improve information and decrease the risk faced by foreign lenders. As emphasized by Gourinchas and Jeanne [2002] , by increasing the cost of expropriation of foreign lenders and investors,¯nancial integration is also likely to decrease the risk of expropriation and thus the risk premium they require. To the extent that all these lead to a decrease in x,¯nancial integration will decrease saving and increase the size of the current account de¯cit. So far we have focused only on saving, but it is straightforward to build on this simple structure, and the results can easily be summarized in words:
² Allow production to depend on capital, and take a country which is poorer in the sense of having less capital, and thus a higher marginal product than the others. How much investment will take place will depend on both the cost of borrowing, and on the evolution of the terms of trade: the lower the relative price of domestic goods in the future, the less attractive it is to invest in the production of domestic goods.
Then, very much for the same reasons economic integration is likely to lead to a decrease in saving, it is likely to lead to an increase in investment. Rather obviously, to the extent that¯nancial integration leads to a lower cost of¯nance, investment will increase. And to the extent that goods market integration leads to an increase in the elasticity of demand for domestic goods, investment will also increase:
The higher the elasticity of demand, the smaller the decrease in price needed to sell the additional output in the future, and so the more attractive investment this period.
² To the extent that investment increases, this will lead, both directly and indirectly, to a larger current account de¯cit than in our model earlier. Directly, as the increase in investment is only partly o®set by an increase in saving. Indirectly, to the extent that higher investment leads to higher expected growth, (an increase in g relative to g ¤ ),
higher real income in the future, and so lower saving this period.
² Poorer countries are poorer not only because they have lower capital, but also because they have lower total factor productivity. Again, the evidence is that both goods and¯nancial market integration are likely to lead, in particular through higher competition, to an increase in total factor productivity. To the extent that this is the case, this is likely to improve growth prospects in poorer countries, and lead to a further decrease in saving.
² Financial integration often comes, at least in part, with domestic¯-nancial liberalization. New instruments, for example more°exible mortgages, may be introduced. To the extent that this is the case, and that domestic¯nancial liberalization leads to lower saving, the e®ect on integration on the current account will be reinforced.
To summarize: Both¯nancial and goods market integration are likely to lead, in the poorer countries, to both a decrease in saving and an increase in investment, and so to a deterioriation of the current balance. If integration is the basic force behind the widening of current account balances, one would expect the e®ect of the Single Market to be much stronger for EU countries than for OECD countries in general.
² \Euro area", or Euro for short, the countries now in the Euro area, minus Luxembourg, so 11 countries in all. (Greece, which joined in 2001, is included throughout). The rationale for looking at this group is equally obvious. With the¯xing of parities in the 1990s, and the shift to the Euro at the end of the 1990s, one would again expect the degree of integration to be stronger for Euro countries than for EU or a fortiori OECD countries in general.
² \Euro minus", the set of countries in the Euro area, minus Portugal and Greece, 9 countries in all. The purpose of looking at this subgroup is simply to see whether the results for the Euro area are due to these two countries or hold even in the rest of the Euro area.
To start, Figure 1 reports the standard deviations of the cross{country distribution of the ratio of current account balances to GDP for each year.
(For current account balances|and, later, saving and investment|we use data from the European Commission. These are based on national income accounts and, post 1995, on the ESA95 EU accounting system. The numbers are not always equal to those published by the OECD, which appear sometimes based on other sources (for example on Bank of Greece data for Greece, which are based on bank settlement data rather than trade data).
The di®erences can be non negligible: In 2000, the current account de¯cit of Greece was 4.5% according to the EU, 7% according to the OECD. But the di®erences are mostly level di®erences, and the conclusions below are roughly una®ected by which series we use.) Figure 1a reports results for each of the¯rst three groups described above. The time series have three characteristics:
² The results are similar across the three groups; indeed, there is no evidence of stronger widening of balances for either the Euro area or the EU than for the OECD as a whole.
² There is a sharp but temporary increase in the standard deviation in the early 1980s
² There is a steady increase in the standard deviation since the late 1980s, leading to a more than doubling of the standard deviation of the last 15 years.
A further look at the data suggests a sharp di®erence between the short lived increase of the early 1980s and the steady increase later on. The increase of the early 1980s is entirely due to large unsustainable de¯cits in just two countries. The¯rst is Portugal. We brie°y discussed the episode in the introduction, a period of very large unsustainable de¯cits, due to the aftermath of the revolution, the loss of colonies, the second oil shock, and a loss of control of¯scal policy. The second country is Ireland, where the combination of the oil shock and a¯scal expansion (with¯scal de¯cits exceeding 12% of GDP) also led to very large and unsustainable current account de¯cits. The point that nearly all of the action in the early 1980s
comes from these two countries is shown in Figure 1b , which plots the standard deviation for Euro countries, with and without Portugal and Ireland.
When the two countries are left out, the peak of the early 1980s is fully gone, and the standard deviation rises more or less steadily from the early 1980s on, with a sharper increase in the 1990s.
The next step is to try to explain which countries have been running larger de¯cits, and which countries have been running larger surpluses. Basic growth theory, and the open economy model presented in the previous section, suggest exploring the relation between the level of output per capita and the current account balance. Countries that are poorer have more potential for catch up, either through capital accumulation, or technological progress. Economic integration makes it easier for them to decrease saving and increase investment, thus to run larger current account de¯cits.
We take a¯rst pass at the data in Figure 2 . The¯gure is a set of scatterplots of the time average of the ratio of the current account de¯cit to GDP against the time average of output per capita, for two subperiods, 1985-1994, and 1995-2001, ² The stronger increase for the EU than for the OECD as a whole, and the even stronger increase for the Euro area than for the EU (although the di®erence between EU and EURO is too small to be statistially or economically signi¯cant).
Both features are very much consistent with the idea that integration is an important factor behind current account evolutions. Integration was higher to start with within the EU or the Euro area, and has continued at a higher pace. To look at the relation further, we run the following speci¯cation:
The speci¯cation is largely standard (for a good survey of the literature of the determinants of current accounts, see for example Debelle and Faruqee [1996] ) The ratio of the current account balance in year t for country i depends on a common time e®ect, on the level of income per capita in year t, and on other control variables included in the vector X it . The only non standard aspect of the speci¯cation, and the one central to our exploration here, is that we allow the e®ect of the level of income per capita, to vary from year to year.
In our basic speci¯cation, we use two controls (in addition to the time e®ects). The¯rst is the dependency ratio, constructed as the ratio of population to the labor force. The other is the rate of growth of output from year t ¡ 1 to t, to capture cyclical e®ects of movements in output on the current account. The theory we saw earlier suggests that integration may also a®ect the elasticity with respect to cyclical movements; for this reason, we also allow the e®ect of output growth to vary from year to year. The simplest way to present our results is by plotting the set of estimated coe±cients b t against time. This is done in the four panels of Figure 3 .
² Figure 3a shows the results for OECD minus. The coe±cient is nearly always positive, but there is no obvious trend. In other words, the widening of current account balances does not appear to re°ect an increased dependence of the current account on the level of income.
² Figure 3b does the same for the EU. There, the evolution of the es- capita is about 8,000 in Greece, 17,000 in Denmark).
² Figure 3c does the same for EURO. The coe±cients look very much the same as for the EU, as a whole; this is not a great surprise, given that the overlap between the two groups. Figure 3d¯nally shows the results for the EURO minus, to check the in°uence of Portugal and
Greece. The increase is actually larger in the 1990s when Portugal and Greece are left out, with the coe±cient reaching 2.1% in 2001.
In short, Figure 3 suggests that, for the EU, the widening of current account positions can be largely accounted for by an increased dependence The main conclusions we draw from the four panels are two: The coe±cients are typically positive: countries which have borrowed in the past tend to run current account de¯cits. This conclusion has been well documented by others. But there is no evidence of a stronger But the time series of estimated coe±cients on output per capita is nearly identical to that in Figure 3 . In other words, the increased widening does not appear to come from diverging evolutions of public saving across countries.
We turn to one last issue, whether the increased dependence of current account balances on output per capita re°ects an increased dependence of saving, or an increased dependence of investment.
To do so, we simply run the basic speci¯cation, replacing the ratio of the current account to GDP¯rst by the ratio of saving to GDP, and then by the ratio of investment to GDP.
The four panels of Figure 5 shows the results of the saving regression.
We draw two conclusions: This, combined with integration, has led to larger current account de¯cits.
The four panels of Figure 6 show the results of the same exercise, this time for investment. They suggest two conclusions.
² The coe±cient is typically negative: A lower income per capita is associated with higher investment, the sign predicted by the standard model.
² There is however no evidence of a trend, of a more negative e®ect of income per capita on investment over time (One can see a small decrease in the coe±cient in the 1990s, but this is too small and too recent to qualify as a trend). In short, the increased dependence of current account balances on income per capita re°ects, for the most part, an e®ect through saving than an e®ect through investment.
The importance of the e®ect through saving suggests the relevance of trying to separate the e®ects of integration and internal¯nancial liberalization. With this in mind, we explored whether controlling for the spread between the prime lending rate and the short{term treasury bill rate made a di®erence to our results. Our attempt to construct a plausible measure along these lines (using a proxy for the prime lending rate, and a proxy for the treasury bill rate, from the IMF IFS statistics) was unsuccessful: Even at low frequencies, the series for the spread rarely make sense, and appear to re°ect movements in the yield curve than movements due to improvements in¯nancial intermediation. Thus, we do not report these results here. We are exploring alternative proxies, for example the ratio of M 3 to GDP.
Panel data regressions only go so far, and one often has a better sense of the underlying mechanisms by looking at individual countries. This is what we do in the next section, where we return to the experience of Portugal and Greece. In trying to assess how much of the change in the current account de¯cit is due to a change in saving or to a change in investment, one must be The numbers in Table 1 for public and private saving, and for household saving, are adjusted for in°ation. More speci¯cally, based on information about the composition of debt by currency denomination, we add to the o±cial number for public saving an amount equal to in°ation times the proportion of the public debt denominated in domestic currency times the debt. (The adjustment matters very much, as in°ation has decreased from an average 14% over 1985-1991, to 7% over 1992-1996 , and to 3.5% since; the average ratio of public debt denominated in domestic currency has remained stable around 50%) We subtract a similar amount from private saving, and so leave unchanged the o±cial number for the current account. This amounts to the assumption that the public debt is held domestically; in the absence of data on domestic and foreign holdings of public debt, there is no obviously better feasible adjustment. We also subtract a similar amount from household saving: This implicitly assumes that public debt is held by households rather than corporations. Again, in the absence of relevant data, there is little choice than to make that assumption. Finally, we make no further adjustment to adjust for other nominal debt, in particular, corporate debt. Figure 7 and the numbers in Table 1 suggest four conclusions:
Back to Portugal and Greece

Portugal
² The increase in the current account dates back to the late 1980s, but has accelerated in the second half of the 1990s. Using 1985-1991 as the base period, the current account de¯cit has increased by 10.6% of GDP.
² The increase in the current account de¯cit is due for less than one third to an increase in investment. The ratio of investment to GDP has increased by 2.8% since 1985-1991. The increase is much larger if we compare the ratio to its value in the early 1990s (an increase of 5.3%), but much of that increase is likely cyclical, re°ecting the period of low growth of the early 1990s.
² The increase in the current account de¯cit is due for more than two thirds to a decrease in saving. The ratio of saving to GDP has decreased by about 7.8% of GDP relative to its 1985-1991 value.
² The decrease in saving re°ects primarily a decrease in private saving.
Public saving, after in°ation correction, has decreased by 2.2% of GDP, relative to 1985-1991; private saving has decreased by 5.6%. (In°ation accounting is important here. Absent the in°ation correction, the shift in private saving would look much larger, 10.1%; and public saving would show a rise of 3.1%)
² The decrease in private saving re°ects primarily a decrease in household saving. The ratio of household saving has decreased by 3.8%, the ratio of corporate saving by 1.8%.
We now look at some aspects of the story behind these numbers.
Take the decrease in household saving¯rst. We see the image which comes out of our description of Portuguese evolutions as consistent with that from panel data regressions. It is one in which integration, especially¯nancial integration (and integration rather than domestic¯nancial liberalization) has led to lower saving, and to a lesser extent to higher investment, both leading to larger current account de¯cits.
There is however an alternative view of the current account de¯cit in Portugal, one based on the loss of competitiveness and overvaluation. It points to the decline in exports, due to their unfavorable specialization:
In 1995, one fourth of total exports were accounted for by clothing and footwear, among the products more exposed to competition from developing countries. It suggests that the rate at which Portugal joined the Euro, together with nominal rigidities, has led to an overvalued exchange rate, and in turn a current account de¯cit.
Separating out the role of overvaluation and the mechanisms we have focused on in this paper is far from obvious, both conceptually and empirically. But we see the overall evidence in favor of overvaluation as weak.
First, looking at it from the trade balance side, most of the current account de¯cit is the re°ection of an unusually high growth rate of imports, rather than an unusually low growth rate of exports. Second, one would expect overvaluation, and so a low demand for domestic goods, to be associated with unusually low GDP growth; this has not been the case. Figure 8 shows the evolution of investment and saving, as ratios to GDP, from 1981 to 2001, for Greece. It shows that the divergence between investment and saving is more recent than in Portugal, dating back only to the mid 1990s. Table 2 presents the basic numbers. One must again be careful about the choice of a base period. Just as Portugal, Greece went through a recession in the mid{1990s, and using that period as the base would be misleading. trade. We report the two sets of numbers in the¯rst two lines of Figure   8 , but, for consistency with the numbers for the other variables, base the rest of our analysis (and Figure 8) on the EU numbers. While the levels of the de¯cit according to the two sources are very di®erent, the change in the de¯cit is essentially the same: a wider current account de¯cit of around 3%
Greece
of GDP (2.5% according to the EU, 3.2% according to the OECD.)
The numbers in the table are also adjusted for in°ation, along the same lines as for Portugal. Again, the adjustment matters a lot: The in°ation rate has decreased from 18% for 1981-1991, to 12.5% for 1992-1995, and 5.0% since 1996 (it stands around 3% today); Gross public debt increased from 50% in 1985 to 100% of GDP in 1992, and it has remained above 100% since. Table 2 . Current Account Balance, Investment, and Saving, as ratios to GDP, percent. Greece 1981 Greece -2001 Greece 1981 Greece -1991 Greece 1992 Greece -1995 Greece 1996 Greece -2001 Greece 2000 Greece -2001 Current account (EU-Nat Def) -0. ² By implication, all the increase in the current account de¯cit can be traced to a decrease in saving. The current account de¯cit has increased by 3.5%. Saving has decreased by 3.4%
² The decrease in saving is more than fully accounted for by an even larger decrease in private saving. Private saving has decreased by 7.7%, while public saving has increased by 4.3%. This is very di®erent from Portugal. There, as we saw in Table 1 , both private and public saving have decreased. In Greece the swing in (in°ation adjusted) private saving has been twice as large as in Portugal but has been partly o®set by the increase in (in°ation adjusted) public saving.
² The decomposition between corporate and household saving can only be made from 1995 on, the date at which the Greek national accounts start decomposing private saving. Based on this information, it appears that much of the decrease in private saving comes from a decrease in retained earnings, rather than a decrease in household saving.
There has indeed been a clear shift of¯rms from internal¯nance to share issues. The°ow of capital raised in the stock market went from zero in 1995-1996 to 8% in 2001 . A plausible explanation is the stock market boom, that lasted from early 1998 to the end of 1999.
One might have expected the decrease in retained earnings to an increase in household saving (although this may be assuming too much rationality on the part of stockholders). There was no such increase. Household saving has remained°at since 1995. The volume of consumer loans, which was equal to 1.6% of GDP in 1995, now is equal to 6%. The volume of mortgage loans, which was equal to 6% is now equal to 18%. It is clear that domestic nancial liberalization is playing an important role here, very much along the lines of Section 1: Consumer loans were virtually prohibited until 1997.
Financial integration has allowed this decrease in saving to show up as an increase in the current account de¯cit, rather than a decrease in investment.
A further look at the capital account suggests the complexity of the changes in¯nancing°ows accompanying liberalization and integration. In The e®ect appears to be mostly through saving. Here, it is tempting, despite the obvious warnings about the interaction between public and private saving, to link some of the di®erences across countries to di®erences in public saving. One of the reasons why Greece has a smaller current account de¯cit than Portugal may be related to the fact that Greece went through a substantial¯scal consolidation, not Portugal. (Ireland would be another case of a country where a very large increase in public saving has more than o®set the decrease in private saving).
Back to the Feldstein Horioka puzzle
Our¯ndings are obviously closely to the research triggered by the \Feldstein{Horioka" puzzle, the high correlation between investment and saving rates, both across time and across countries. Our¯ndings of an increasing positive dependence of saving on income per capita and a negative dependence of investment on income per capita raise the possibility that this correlation has decreased through time.
With this in mind, we explore the relation between investment and saving across countries and time. We do so by running two sets of regressions.
First, we run¯rst conventional Feldstein Horioka regressions of investment on saving, over di®erent time periods:
where I it and S it are ratios of investment and saving to GDP in country i and year t. Table 3 To look at the evolution of the relation between investment and saving more closely, we then run the following regression:
That is, we allow for both year e®ects and year speci¯ic coe±cients on saving. Figure 9 plots the time series for estimated b t 's, for the four groups of countries we have de¯ned earlier, plus the OECD as a whole. The¯ve panels con¯rm and amplify the results from Table 3 : The very integration which leads to larger current account de¯cits also reduces their generational distribution implications.
² This limiting case is too strong however. Even Euro area countries are short of being fully integrated, and surely face downward sloping demand for their domestic goods. And so, to the extent that large current account de¯cits today lead to the need for trade surpluses in the future, they also lead to the need for low relative prices for domestic goods in the future, and so to lower income (in terms of consumption) for future generations. In this case, the legacy of high current account de¯cits is not low capital, but their adverse e®ect on future terms of trade. This provides an argument for higher public saving today; but the argument seems empirically weaker than the standard closed economy capital accumulation argument.
Another line of arguments relies on the presence of other imperfections.
The most obvious one, in the case of the Euro area, is the presence of nominal rigidities. Indeed, one of the standard common currency areas is the problem of adjustment of relative prices across countries. Granted the presence of nominal rigidities, the question is what implications this has in this case. Let's again review the basic theory:
² Under°exible prices, the increase in the current account de¯cit comes with a real appreciation, an increase in the relative price of domestic goods. Later on, when time comes to repay or service the increased debt, the need to generate a trade surplus requires a real depreciation.
² If prices are rigid (or at least do not fully adjust), and output is determined by demand, the real appreciation will be less than would take place under°exible prices. The shifts in saving and investment we discussed in Section 1 will then be lead to both an increase in output above its natural level, and a smaller current account de¯cit than would be the case under°exible prices.
² How nominal rigidities a®ect what happens in the future depends on the exact nature of these rigidities.
If prices do not fully adjust in the future when time comes to repay or service the debt (a more doubtful proposition, as this is both a slow and very predictable event), then the attempt of consumers and¯rms to repay or service the additional debt will, in the future, lead to a decrease in output below its natural level|to a recession|and, through that mechanism, to the trade surplus needed to repay or service the debt.
To the extent that future prices can adjust, the trade surplus will be generated through a depreciation rather than a decrease in output.
To the extent that repayment takes place gradually (as opposed to the rapid repayment required in currency crises), this case strikes us as a more reasonable working hypothesis.
² If the governments of Portugal and Greece do not change their¯scal stance (they obviously have no control over monetary policy, and because of the symmetry between current account surpluses and de¯cits across countries in the Euro area, the ECB has no reason to respond by changing monetary policy), the shifts in saving and investment in response to integration will lead to output in excess of its natural level.
area, and thus eventually generates the required appreciation.
² If those governments decide instead to maintain output at its natural level, say through higher public saving, they will, by implication, reduce the current account de¯cit. Under the assumption that the marginal propensity to import is the same for all types of spending (consumption, investment, government), using¯scal policy to maintain output at its natural level will require eliminating the current account de¯cit altogether.
² Only a formal model can tell us exactly what¯scal policy should be in this case. But it is surely not to fully o®set the increase in private spending so as to maintain output at its natural level. This would have the implication of largely or fully eliminating the current account de¯cit, thus losing one of the main bene¯ts of economic integration, namely the ability to intertemporally reallocate consumption and investment. So, while benign neglect may not be optimal, it appears, at least for those de¯cits, to be a reasonable course of action.
